The Government of India Act, 1935

The Government of India Act, 1935 was Britain's last and largest constitutional scheme for India. It grew out of the Simon Report and the Round Table Conferences. It proposed an all-India federation (which never came into being) and granted provincial autonomy (which did, in 1937). However, it was hedged with so many "safeguards" and "special responsibilities" for the governors that Nehru likened it to "a car, all brakes and no engine." Much of its administrative machinery was carried into the Constitution of independent India. This is a very high-yield topic.

The Act, passed by the British Parliament in August 1935, envisaged an All-India Federation comprising the British Indian provinces, the chief commissioner's provinces, and the princely states. Its formation required enough princely states to agree to join: specifically, states holding at least 52 seats in the proposed Council of States and representing half the total population of the states. They never did, so the federation never came into being. The centre continued to be run under the older Government of India Act, 1919 up to 1946.

At the centre, the scheme provided:

• Dyarchy: subjects were split into reserved (foreign affairs, defence, ecclesiastical and tribal affairs), administered by the governor-general on the advice of his executive councillors (not responsible to the legislature), and transferred subjects, administered on the advice of ministers responsible to the federal legislature.
• The governor-general was the pivot of the whole Constitution. He had wide "special responsibilities" and the power to act in his individual judgement. He could certify bills, restore cuts in grants, issue ordinances and veto legislation.
• A bicameral legislature: an upper Council of States (260 members, partly directly elected, partly nominated by the princes) and a lower Federal Assembly (375 members, indirectly elected and partly nominated by the princes). Notably, election to the Council of States was direct, while election to the Assembly was indirect. 80 per cent of the budget was non-votable.

The Act also laid out a detailed federal framework:

• Three lists: legislative subjects were divided between the centre and the provinces through a Federal List, a Provincial List, and a Concurrent List.
• Residuary powers: subjects not in any list were not given to either legislature. The residuary powers were vested in the governor-general, who could allot them as he judged fit. This is a favourite exam point.
• Federal Court: the Act provided for a Federal Court, which was actually set up in 1937. It settled disputes between the centre and the units and heard appeals from the high courts. It was the forerunner of the Supreme Court of India.

The Act's real change was in the provinces, where provincial autonomy replaced dyarchy:

• provinces were granted autonomy and a separate legal identity, deriving their authority directly from the Crown rather than from the secretary of state;
• they were given independent financial powers and could borrow on their own security;
• all provincial subjects were administered by a council of ministers responsible to the legislature and headed by a premier; ministers could be removed by an adverse vote;
• the franchise was extended (women got the vote on the same basis as men), and the Act reserved seats for women in the legislatures; members were directly elected; contrast this with the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, which gave only a narrow property-based franchise and did not grant voting rights to all women above 21; and
• but the governor retained sweeping special powers over minorities, civil servants, law and order, and British business interests. He could take over and run the administration indefinitely. He could refuse assent to bills, issue ordinances and enact his own "Governor's Acts." 40 per cent of the provincial budget remained non-votable. Separate (communal) electorates under the Communal Award were also operationalised.

The Act was condemned by nearly all sections and rejected by the Congress, which demanded instead a Constituent Assembly elected on adult franchise to frame India's own constitution.

• The governor-general's and governors' "safeguards" and "special responsibilities" acted as brakes on the working of the Act.
• The franchise reached only about 14 per cent of the population.
• The extension of communal electorates promoted separatist tendencies that culminated in Partition.
• It was a rigid constitution with no scope for internal growth; the power of amendment rested with the British Parliament.

The British aim, as the viceroy Lord Linlithgow admitted, was to frame it "as the best way of maintaining British influence in India." This meant weakening the national movement, reviving the constitutionalist liberals, and provincialising the Congress so the central leadership would weaken. Nehru dismissed it: "We are provided with a car, all brakes and no engine." Yet, despite the rejection, much of its provincial machinery and federal structure shaped the Constitution of independent India.